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[1299] 
From Victims to Litigants 
Elizabeth L. MacDowell*
This Article reports findings from an ethnographic study of self-help programs in two 
western states. The study investigated how self-help assistance provided by partnerships 
between courts and nongovernmental organizations implicates advocacy and access to 
justice for domestic violence survivors. The primary finding is that self-help programs 
may inadvertently work to curtail, rather than expand, advocacy resources. 
Furthermore, problems identified with self-help service delivery and negative impacts 
on advocacy systems may be explained by the structure of work within self-help 
programs and the nature of partnerships to provide self-help services. The Author 
uncovers previously unseen impacts of self-help programs on survivors and on the 
resources to help them. She concludes with a discussion of the implications for future 
research directions and describes what can be done now to improve self-help services 
for survivors.  
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Introduction 
This Article examines how the delivery of self-help legal services is 
shaped by structural factors within self-help programs, including 
partnerships between courts and nongovernmental organizations 
(“NGOs”), and the implications for advocacy on behalf of abuse 
survivors.1
 
 1. For the purposes of this Article, the term self-help refers to legal services that do not involve 
or result in an attorney-client relationship. Under this definition, self-help services may be provided or 
supervised by attorneys or nonattorneys, and include a range of assistance such as electronic and 
software-based services, and one-on-one assistance with completing and filing forms. See John M. 
Greacen, Resources to Assist Self-Represented Litigants: A Fifty-State Review of the “State of 
the Art” 3 (2011) (summarizing information resources provided to self-represented litigants by 
courts); Self-Representation Resource Guide, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/ 
Access-and-Fairness/Self-Representation/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited May 29, 2016) (listing 
examples of self-help resources offered by courts); see also Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? 
Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 453, 
466–70 (2011) (discussing forms of unbundled legal services and limited scope representation that 
overlap with self-help services as defined here). 
 Protection orders are a primary legal remedy for domestic 
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violence,2 and self-help programs often serve the most vulnerable of 
survivors.3 As partnerships between courts and NGOs to provide 
assistance to unrepresented litigants expand, these services for protection 
order applicants increase as well.4 Yet, little is known about the efficacy 
of self-help services, or their impact on advocacy-based services or 
systemic advocacy.5
I have previously reported findings about interactions between self-
help program staff members and litigants, analyzed through the lens of 
 This Article examines data from an ethnographic 
study of domestic violence self-help programs in two western states for 
evidence of how self-help assistance models implicate advocacy for 
survivors. In particular, it explains how preliminary findings pointing 
toward specific advocacy problems may be explained by the structure of 
work within self-help programs and the nature of partnerships between 
NGOs and courts. 
 
 2. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help 
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1487, 1503 n.103 (2008) (noting 
that applying for a protection order is second only to calling 911); see also Susan Keilitz, Improving 
Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case 
Management and Technology Solutions, in Handbook Of Domestic Violence Intervention 
Strategies: Policies, Programs, and Legal Remedies 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) 
(reporting survivors seek civil protection orders more often than criminal remedies); Patricia Tjaden 
& Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings 
from the National Violence Against Women Survey, at iii, 52 (2000) (reporting that approximately 
seventeen percent of female survivors of domestic violence obtain civil protection orders each year). 
 3. See infra Part II (reporting data from the programs in this study); see also Admin. Office of 
the Courts, Equal Access Fund: A Report to the California Legislature 54 (2005) (reporting 
that a study of self-help programs provided through court-community partnerships in California found 
that almost two-thirds (63%) of partnership project customers are women; at least 58% were 
minorities, with Hispanic individuals comprising the largest percentage (39%)); Office of the Deputy 
Chief Admin. Judge for Justice Initiatives, Self-Represented Litigants: Characteristics, Needs, 
Services 1, 3–4 (2005) (reporting findings from a survey of unrepresented family court litigants in New 
York City showing slightly less than half of respondents were women (45%), but 84% were minorities 
(48% African American and 31% Hispanic), 39% had only a high school-level education, and 53% 
earned less than $20,000 per year); John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants and Court and 
Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know 3–6 (2002) (reporting studies of self-
help service populations). For a discussion of the particular vulnerabilities of domestic violence 
survivors using self-help programs, see Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the Politics of 
Self-Help, 22 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 203, 207–09 (2016). 
 4. On the expansion of self-help services, see Judicial Council of Cal., Task Force on Self-
Represented Litigants, Statewide Action Plan for Serving Self-Represented Litigants 1 (2003) 
(“Court-based staffed self-help centers, supervised by attorneys, are the optimum way for courts to 
facilitate the timely and cost-effective processing of cases involving self-represented litigants, to 
increase access to the courts and improve delivery of justice to the public.”). See Admin. Office of the 
Courts, California Courts Self-Help Centers: Report to the California Legislature 1–2 (2007) 
(reporting budget allocations for self-help programs are being increased). But see Tim Cory, California 
Courts’ New Funding Formula: The Workload Allocation Funding Methodology, U.S. Common Sense 
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://cacs.org/research/california-courts-wafm-assessment/ (reporting cuts to civil self-
help services). 
 5. See MacDowell, supra note 3, at 226–28 (discussing the three existing studies of self-help 
services in the United States). 
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demeanor.6 Sociologists have used the concept of demeanor to analyze 
how individuals including judges, clerks, and advocates exert authority in 
interactions with abuse survivors and perpetrators.7 In my article 
Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help, I modify and expand on 
prior demeanor typologies to map the ways in which self-help staff 
members regulate applicants’ conduct and shape the protection order 
process.8 I show that the regulatory function of demeanor at the 
programs studied here mirror stereotypes and norms that victims should 
be passive rather than empowered self-advocates.9 I also show how staff 
members limit relief available to survivors by excluding or refusing 
assistance with some remedies, discouraging applicants from seeking 
disfavored relief or from filing an application, and withholding information 
and assistance selectively, depending on how they responded to individual 
litigants.10
This Article turns from documenting the operation of staff member 
demeanor to identifying its organizational and structural building blocks. 
The primary finding is that self-help programs may inadvertently work to 
curtail, rather than expand, some advocacy resources for domestic 
violence survivors in the community, even as they provide needed 
assistance and broaden the criteria for who is eligible to receive help.
 
11 
Services at the programs studied are focused on completing and 
processing forms, rather than applicants’ broader needs or systemic 
reform, and are not coordinated with other services to make the system 
more effective. Moreover, even within their narrow service orientation, 
the programs provided incomplete and problematic assistance. Additionally, 
the data show that participation in self-help partnerships by NGOs can 
present new challenges to empowerment-based advocacy models, which 
focus on helping survivors meet self-defined needs.12 These findings both 
comport with and expand on previous research showing how the 
imposition of bureaucracy and hierarchy, and the alliance with institutional 
rather than social change goals, undermines advocacy for abuse survivors.13
 
 6. Id. at 232–44. 
 
 7. James Ptacek, Battered Women in the Courtroom: The Power of Judicial Responses 92–
111, 133 (1999) (reporting findings of a study of judicial demeanor toward protection order applicants 
and defendants); Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process: Observations 
on a Court Advocacy Program, 6 Violence Against Women 606, 621 (2000) (applying Ptacek’s 
typology to judges and other court personnel and advocates); see also Maureen Mileski, Courtroom 
Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 Law & Soc’y Rev. 473, 521–31 (1971) 
(discussing the ways in which judges use demeanor to “situationally sanction” defendants found guilty 
of lessor crimes). 
 8. MacDowell, supra note 3, at 232–44. 
 9. Id. at 244–52. 
 10. Id. at 248–52. 
 11. See infra Part II (discussing findings). 
 12. See infra Part II (discussing findings). 
 13. See infra Part I (discussing studies of lay advocacy for survivors). 
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The findings also demonstrate the importance of a broad approach to 
studying access to justice that moves beyond individual cases and 
attitudes to examine institutions and systems. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks informing the analysis, including the role of 
demeanor in legal systems as a regulatory mechanism, and its effects on 
survivors accessing the courts. It then explains the role of advocacy in 
helping survivors access protection orders, and the challenges posed to 
empowerment-based approaches by professionalization and collaboration 
with the state. This is followed by a discussion of trends in poverty law 
practice that further limit advocacy for abuse survivors. This includes 
perspectives within poverty law practice that do not view family law as 
amenable to structural reform goals, as well as legal aid’s turn from 
structural reform to direct services and self-help. Part II describes the 
current study, including relevant background information on Programs A 
and B, an overview of how the programs assist applicants with the 
protection order process, and the methodology used for the study. Part 
III discusses the findings. This Part shows how the organization of work 
within the self-help programs, and the larger organizational structures of 
which they are a part, shapes the delivery of services and impacts advocacy. 
Part IV then discusses implications of the findings for researchers, 
reformers, and service providers. This Part provides further analysis of 
the systemic impacts of the self-help programs in this study. It concludes 
with suggestions for future research on the systemic impacts of self-help 
interventions, and suggestions for reformers and service providers on 
ways to improve self-help services now. 
I.  Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
A. Demeanor in Legal Systems 
Demeanor is an analytical construct that differentiates the expressive 
aspect of interactions from their material function: “how” a thing is done, 
as opposed to “what” is done.14 Sociologist Erving Goffman refers to the 
first as ceremonial conduct and the second as substantive conduct.15 
According to Goffman, demeanor is expressed through the dimensions 
of language (the words chosen for an exchange), spatial relationships 
(the distance maintained between persons), and within the performance 
of tasks.16
 
 14. Ptacek, supra note 
 For example, a judge may grant an order in such a way as to 
underscore or undermine its legitimacy. Similarly, a clerk may handle a 
7, at 93–95 (relating this concept to judicial actions in protection order 
hearings). 
 15. See Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am. Anthropologist 473, 
476 (1956). 
 16. Id. at 477. 
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phone call abruptly or solicitously. Issuing the order and answering the 
phone are examples of substantive conduct, having meaning regardless of 
how they are done. The manner, tone, and words used in completing the 
acts constitute demeanor.17 Along with other social rules that govern 
interactions, such as deference, demeanor operates at an unconscious 
level most of the time, perhaps surfacing only when expectations about 
another’s behavior are not met.18 Yet, the performance of these rules 
helps to define and construct individuals and groups through social 
interaction, and the violation of rules of conduct can lead to social 
sanctions.19
For example, in a study of criminal court judges, Maureen Mileski 
found that judges varied their demeanor according to the seriousness of 
the crime.
 The study of demeanor can lend insight into the dynamics of 
power and other aspects of social relationships within institutions, 
including its regulatory function within sociolegal settings. 
20 In interactions with defendants who were convicted of 
serious crimes, judges usually maintained a detached and neutral affect.21 
However, judges issued what Mileski called “situational sanctions” (such 
as reprimands in open court) to punish defendants who had committed 
lesser crimes, disrespected staff, or disrupted the courtroom.22 Mileski 
observed that this shift in a judge’s demeanor served a leveling function, 
evening out the expression of moral indignation between defendants 
receiving relatively light sentences and those convicted of crimes carrying 
more onerous penalties.23
Other studies of judicial demeanor demonstrate how demeanor can 
be used to reward as well as punish. Drawing on Mileski’s work, James 
Ptacek analyzed the demeanor of judges in civil protection order 
hearings using a typology of five demeanor categories: good-natured, 
bureaucratic, condescending, firm or formal, and harsh.
 
24 Ptacek found 
that judges most commonly treated applicants in a good-natured manner 
(for example, by showing interest and concern and making sure they 
understood the legal process and their options) and rarely spoke to them 
harshly or condescendingly.25
 
 17. See Ptacek, supra note 
 In contrast, the most commonly observed 
demeanor toward defendants was firm or formal demeanor, which 
underscored the judge’s disapproval of the abuse and her willingness to 
7, at 93–94 (discussing a similar example). 
 18. See Goffman, supra note 15, at 474 (explaining that demeanor is often expressed “unthinkingly”). 
 19. See id. at 475 (arguing that rules of conduct should be analyzed as social action). 
 20. Mileski, supra note 7, at 523–26. 
 21. Id. at 524 (reporting that most judges behaved in a bureaucratic manner, remaining detached 
and affectively neutral). 
 22. Id. at 523. 
 23. See id. at 525–26. 
 24. Ptacek, supra note 7, at 98. 
 25. Id. at 100–01, 103–04. 
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sanction abusers.26 Conversely, judges who treated applicants with 
condescension or spoke sharply to them tended to be solicitous of the 
defendant.27 Because the judge’s demeanor toward each party took place 
in a courtroom where both parties were present, Ptacek observes that 
how judges treated abusers was a dimension of their demeanor toward 
battered women and vice versa.28
Subsequently, researcher Angela Moe Wan applied Ptacek’s typology 
to analyze the demeanor of participants in the protection order process, 
with similar findings for judges and for advocates helping women with 
applications.
 
29 Wan found advocates sometimes exhibited bureaucratic, 
or firm or formal demeanor with clients, despite the advocates’ 
ostensibly supportive purpose.30 In keeping with the regulatory function of 
demeanor, Wan found that advocates exhibited more negative forms of 
demeanor toward applicants who were more troublesome (for example, 
those questioning advocates’ advice).31
While lacking the substantive or legal authority of judges, the 
demeanor of self-help staff has particular significance for litigants due to 
their location in the courthouse and their role in providing access to the 
judge.
 
32
 
 26. Id. at 105. 
 In the present study, I modified and expanded Ptacek’s typology 
to create a typology of seven demeanor categories: good-
natured/supportive, token supportive, bureaucratic, apathetic, firm or 
 27. Id. at 109. Notably, these judges were in a jurisdiction that had been subject to intensive 
media scrutiny for bad judicial behavior, and thus may not be representative of judges in protection 
order cases. Id. at 50–68. For studies showing problems survivors often face in family courts, see, for 
example, Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task 
Forces, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 1, 55–58 (1996) (summarizing results from gender bias task 
force studies conducted across the United States); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: 
Sex Discrimination and the Law 241 (1989); Laura L. Crites, Wife Abuse: The Judicial Record, in 
11 Women Courts and Equality 41–42 (Laura L. Crites & Winifred L. Hepperle eds., 1987) (arguing 
family court judges do not understand the dynamics of domestic violence, blame women for being 
victimized, and prioritize men’s privacy over women’s safety); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing 
from Particularity: Perpetrators and Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. Gender, Race & 
Just. 531, 539 nn.28–29 (2013) (summarizing studies of outcomes in custody and visitation cases 
involving domestic violence claims); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of 
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 303, 361 (2011) 
(describing victim-blaming by family court judges). 
 28. Ptacek, supra note 7, at 108. 
 29. See generally Wan, supra note 7, at 621–22 (finding that the last three demeanor categories 
used by Ptacek tended to co-occur, and so combines condescending, firm or formal, and harsh 
demeanor into a single category).  
 30. Id. at 620–21. 
 31. Id. at 624–25. 
 32. See id. at 626 (observing that bureaucratic treatment by advocates may discourage survivors 
from seeking help through the court); see also Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of 
Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 343, 345 
(2003) (describing how survivors’ willingness to use the legal system is formed through interactions 
with courts). 
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formal, harsh, and patronizing/condescending.33
Table 1: Demeanor Toward Litigant 
 These are briefly 
summarized in Table 1. 
Demeanor Types Attributes 
Good-natured/supportive Provides emotional and material support 
Token supportive Personable but superficial 
Bureaucratic Generic, perfunctory responses 
Apathetic Seemingly personal disinterest in helping 
Firm or formal Emphasizes a superior social position 
Harsh Abrasive, intimidating, and/or punishing 
Patronizing/condescending Trivializes concerns, assumes superiority 
 
Application and analysis of these categories demonstrated the 
regulatory function of demeanor in self-help settings serving abuse 
survivors. Not only was a range of demeanor present, as in Ptacek and 
Wan’s studies, and sometimes appearing concurrently, as in Wan’s study, 
but demeanor also shifted or evolved within the span of a single 
interaction.34 Specifically, staff members most commonly treated 
applicants in a bureaucratic, routine manner that failed to address their 
individual needs and concerns.35 Applicants were also sometimes treated 
in a patronizing or condescending manner;36 on the other hand, 
sometimes staff members were apathetic and simply refused to help.37 
However, staff members responded to applicants who self-advocated (for 
instance, by persisting in seeking disfavored remedies or resisting staff 
members’ advice) with increasingly more negative demeanor types, such 
as firm or formal or (albeit infrequently) harsh demeanor.38
 
 33. MacDowell, supra note 
 In contrast, 
applicants who were more passive or compliant were treated with more 
pleasant demeanors, such as good-natured/supportive or token 
3, at 232–44. 
 34. Id. at 244. 
 35. Id. at 236–38. 
 36. Id. at 242–44. 
 37. Id. at 238–39. Even good-natured/supportive staff members offered less emotional support as 
well as substantive assistance than was observed by good-natured/supportive individuals in Ptacek and 
Wan’s studies. Id. at 236. 
 38. Id. at 239–42. 
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supportive demeanor.39 Thus, ironically, staff members punished those 
applicants who were most actively engaged in helping themselves. These 
responses also correspond with the stereotype of the “perfect victim,” 
who is characterized as passive and not self-asserting.40 In this way, “staff 
members reinforced—whether intentionally or not—a dominant trope 
about appropriate behavior for victims under the guise of neutrality.”41
Staff members also shaped protection order applications in 
problematic ways by discouraging or withholding assistance from some 
applicants, and—more routinely—by excluding some types of relief, and 
by limiting applicant narratives. In particular, staff members excluded 
assistance with available economic relief by not mentioning the relief was 
available,
 
42 discouraging applicants who requested disfavored relief from 
applying, and not offering assistance with the forms necessary to obtain 
the relief, even when its availability was disclosed.43 Staff members also 
routinized the drafting of supporting affidavits in ways that limited 
narratives of abuse to recent physical abuse that could be easily reported 
in a chronological fashion.44 The latter finding is consistent with linguist 
Shonna Trinch’s study of paralegals in a prosecutor’s office assisting 
Latina survivors with protection order applications.45 Trinch found that 
the paralegals helped to transform survivor narratives into the linear 
form of narrative preferred by the court, but in doing so failed to provide 
the supportive function sought by survivors, who wanted to be heard.46
 
 39. Id. at 243. 
 
Thus, while providing an essential function—helping survivors access 
protection order remedies—the tailoring of narratives for the court also 
comes with costs for survivors. Survivors’ claims may be limited or 
discouraged altogether, and important contextual facts regarding 
nonphysical abuse may be omitted from their declarations; even those 
who obtain orders may have their goals in taking legal action only 
 40. See Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White 
Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1061, 1078–80 (2006). 
 41. MacDowell, supra note 3, at 246. 
 42. For example, neither program informed applicants about the availability of restitution. Id. at 
248. Additionally, at Program B, applicants were not informed about the availability of attorney fees. 
Id. at 248–49. 
 43. This was the case with child and spousal support at both locations. As a result, judges either 
denied the request or continued the case so that the necessary paperwork could be completed and 
served. Continuance of the case would not only delay the relief, but might also result in the case being 
dropped due to the difficulty many applicants face coming to court. 
 44. See id. at 250–52 (describing how staff members limited applicants’ narratives). 
 45. See Shonna L. Trinch, The Advocate as Gatekeeper: The Limits of Politeness in Protective 
Order Interviews with Latina Survivors of Domestic Abuse, 5 J. Sociolinguistics 475, 476–77 (2001); 
Shonna L. Trinch & Susan Berk-Seligson, Narrating in Protective Order Interviews: A Source of 
Interactional Trouble, 31 Language Soc’y 383, 390, 397 (2002). 
 46. See Trinch & Berk-Seligson, supra note 45, at 410–12. 
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partially fulfilled.47 It also has costs for the system, in that the conventional 
narrative is reinforced by the exclusion of alternative or disfavored 
narratives.48
B. Advocacy in Legal Systems 
 These findings also raise the question: what is the 
relationship between self-help (and other forms of institutional or quasi-
institutional assistance for survivors) and advocacy-based models? 
1. Lay Advocacy 
Lay advocates have traditionally played an important role in providing 
services to survivors, including helping them access legal systems. The early 
battered women’s movement was a survivor-centered effort, both in that 
it focused on the needs of survivors and that many within the movement 
were themselves former battered women.49 The idea was to empower 
victims to become advocates and movement leaders.50 Client advocacy in 
this context was focused on supporting and empowering women to gain 
greater control of their lives.51 Accordingly, advocates provided their 
clients with emotional support and information about options and 
resources, and represented their interests within state institutions.52 In 
addition, advocates worked on behalf of battered women as a group for 
changes in institutional practices as well as law and policy.53
 
 47. The latter can also lead to denial of subsequent claims, for example if the applicant tries to 
plead omitted facts in a later family court case. See MacDowell, supra note 
 Andrea 
Nichols identifies several key features of this early advocacy. First, 
advocates’ understandings of domestic violence and primary practices in 
response were guided by feminist meanings derived from the feminist 
3, at 251. 
 48. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights 
Back, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 75, 123 (2008) (explaining the importance of presenting new narratives 
that challenge norms and stereotypes about domestic violence to judges). 
 49. Ellen Pence, Advocacy on Behalf of Battered Women, in Sourcebook on Violence Against 
Women 329, 330 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
 50. See Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the 
Battered Women’s Movement 66 (1982) (describing the process of politicization at one early shelter). 
 51. See Joanne Belknap & Hillary Potter, The Trials of Measuring the “Success” of Domestic 
Violence Policies, 4 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 559, 561 (2005); Andrea J. Nichols, Meaning-Making 
and Domestic Violence Victim Advocacy: An Examination of Feminist Identities, Ideologies, and 
Practices, 8 Feminist Criminology 177, 179 (2013) (describing how battered women’s advocates 
encouraged survivor autonomy); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 388-61A-0145 (2016) (“Advocacy-
based counseling means the involvement of a client with an advocate counselor . . . with the primary 
focus on safety planning and on empowerment of the client through reinforcing the client’s autonomy 
and self determination.”); Arlene N. Weisz, Legal Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors: The 
Power of an Informative Relationship, 80 Families Soc’y 138, 145–46 (1999) (describing the role of 
advocates in empowering survivors by providing both empathy and vital information). 
 52. See Pence, supra note 49, at 329 (discussing individual case advocacy as opposed to 
institutional or system advocacy). 
 53. See Nichols, supra note 51, at 181. 
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movement of the 1960s.54 Second, advocates utilized survivor-defined, 
intersectional, and social change practices.55
Survivor defined practices were specifically intended to avoid the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures associated with patriarchy, which 
was at the core of feminist understandings of the problem of male 
violence against women.
 
56 These included collaborative, grassroots 
approaches designed to facilitate goal setting and decisionmaking by (rather 
than for) survivors, and ultimately enable their social and economic 
empowerment.57 Intersectional practices, developed and promoted by 
women of color, are those that take into account the multiple identities 
(such as race, class, and sexuality) in addition to gender that impact the 
experience of domestic violence.58 While often neglected by white, 
middle-class reformers and activists who focused on gender alone, these 
practices nonetheless constituted an essential contribution to 
antisubordination work.59 Social change practices sought to change the 
underlying conditions of women’s subordination in society and eliminate 
violence against women.60
Advocacy practices that respect and support the decisionmaking of 
survivors are associated with better outcomes for women—including 
decreasing the likelihood of repeated violence, and helping them to 
develop their sense of self-efficacy and their identity as legal subjects.
 
61 
However, research suggests that only those advocates who identify 
themselves as feminists also articulate intersectional and social change 
practice goals.62 Others take a narrower view, albeit focusing on 
empowerment of survivors. Perhaps reflecting this trend, the National 
Organization of Victim’s Assistance (“NOVA”) defines advocacy work 
minimally as “encouraging a victim to speak for herself or providing her 
with a voice if she is unable to speak.”63
Numerous factors can interfere with the advocate’s role however, 
even within this narrower definition. In particular, researchers document 
 
 
 54. Id. at 178. Note that this does not mean that all advocates self-identified as feminists. 
According to most accounts, there was significant ideological diversity in the movement (including 
among feminists). See Schechter, supra note 50, at 43–52; Pence, supra note 49, at 332. 
 55. Nichols, supra note 51, at 178. 
 56. Id. at 178–79. 
 57. Id. at 179. 
 58. Id. at 180–81; see also Schechter, supra note 50, at 48–49 (discussing the influence of black 
and third world feminists on the battered women’s movement); Pence, supra note 49, at 332 
(discussing perspectives of women of color in the early movement). 
 59. Nichols, supra note 51, at 180. 
 60. Id. at 181. 
 61. See id. at 179; see also Ptacek, supra note 7, at 177 (describing the positive impact of 
advocates on survivors’ experiences in court). 
 62. Nichols, supra note 51, at 182–83 (citing studies); id. at 191–92 (describing findings). 
 63. Trinch, supra note 45, at 476 (citing Marlene A. Young, Victim Assistance: Frontiers and 
Fundamentals 28 (1993)). 
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challenges to advocacy that result from professionalization and 
institutionalization of advocacy functions, including the imposition of 
hierarchical and bureaucratic structures and values that disconnect 
advocates from clients and from larger reform goals.64 In these contexts, 
professional or system goals and objectives overtake client-centered 
ones.65 Even within nongovernmental organizations, advocacy is impacted 
by case-driven approaches and professional goals and objectives that are 
not derived from clients’ self-identified needs.66 Further, due to 
professionalization, survivors have limited pathways to become advocates, 
and NGOs’ objectives are unlikely to include organizing and other social 
change work that can include survivors.67
Another challenge for advocates working within institutions is their 
dual role as gatekeepers. Trinch notes two gatekeeping tasks that 
paralegals helping protection order applicants in the prosecutor’s office 
face:  
 
First, protective order interviewers need to determine whether clients 
are eligible for the order, and second, they need to indicate to clients 
that there are very specific ways that legal complaints must be couched. 
In other words, interviewers must signal to clients that their lay norms 
and ways of narrating abuse are not, in fact, what the court wants to 
hear.68
For system advocates and others working in contexts where they perform 
only or primarily as gatekeepers, this function arguably subsumes the 
advocacy function completely. 
  
2. Legal Aid 
Working in collaboration with lay advocates, legal aid attorneys 
have also played an important role in advocacy for survivors, including 
through law reform. One such effort was the coalition of legal aid 
 
 64. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 51, at 182 (discussing the “growing body of research outlines 
challenges of professionalization” for feminist advocacy strategies); id. at 193–94 (discussing the 
relationship between feminist advocacy and organizational practices); Pence, supra note 49, at 339 
(discussing the impact of professionalization on advocates’ attitudes toward and relationships with 
survivors). 
 65. See Schechter, supra note 50, at 243 (describing how “the goal of sustaining a vision of 
women’s liberation and building a political movement was lost in the struggle to start, fund, manage, 
legitimate, and maintain programs for battered women”); see also Kristin Bumiller, In an Abusive 
State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence 70 
(2008) (“Currently, as part of the process of making battered women’s shelters more professional, a 
mandate exists for changing the primary methods by which shelters work—requiring them to move 
away from encouraging women’s transformation through consciousness raising to a more service-
oriented model that involves administrating clients’ needs.”). 
 66. See Bumiller, supra note 65, at 70 (discussing the negative impacts of professional case 
management on abuse survivors). 
 67. See Pence, supra note 49, at 340–41 (arguing for advocates to return to the inclusion of 
survivors in decisionmaking and to community organizing). 
 68. Trinch, supra note 45, at 477. 
J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc  (Do Not Delete) 6/19/2016 11:59 AM 
June 2016]    FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS 1311 
attorneys and advocates who helped draft and pass the nation’s first 
protection order statue in Pennsylvania.69 Within a few years, protection 
order legislation passed in every state.70 Although the breadth of 
legislation varies among the states, the goal was to expand and improve 
upon existing injunctive relief, available only in divorce, by providing 
expedited access to economic remedies for both married and unmarried 
survivors as well as orders that the adverse party stay away from the 
applicant and cease abusive conduct.71 Economic orders typically include 
orders for child support, spousal support, and restitution.72 Orders for 
attorney’s fees and the exclusive use of property may also be available.73 
Importantly, although violation of a protection order is a crime in every 
state, protection orders were intended to provide survivors with an 
alternative to the criminal legal system, and to be enforceable through 
the civil contempt process.74 These goals specifically reflected the input 
of legal aid and other coalition members who represented the interests of 
low-income women of color, who sought alternatives to criminal legal 
responses to domestic violence.75
As with lay advocates, however, the role of legal aid in law reform is 
compromised by structural developments, as well as by countervailing or 
conflicting values.
 
76 Chief among the former are drops in funding, 
combined with restrictions on activities for legal aid organizations funded 
through the federal Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”).77
 
 69. See Margaret Klaw & Mary Scherf, Feminist Advocacy: The Evolution of Pennsylvania’s 
Protection from Abuse Act, 1 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 21, 21 (1993) (describing “collaboration 
among grassroots women’s advocates, legal services attorneys and sensitive legislators”); see also 
Schechter, supra note 
 Among other 
50, at 162–65 (describing early civil legal reforms for battered women); 
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, VAWA @ 20: Improving Civil Legal Assistance for Ending Gender Violence, 
CUNY L. Rev. Footnote F. (Nov. 21, 2014) (describing the background of protection order 
legislation). 
 70. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 910–1006 (1993); Domestic 
Violence: Protective Orders and the Role of Police Enforcement, Asset (ACLU/Women’s Rights 
Project, New York, N.Y.), June 1, 2007, at 1 (citing Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, 
State Protection Order Laws (2005)). 
 71. Interview with Barbara Hart, Dir. of Strategic Justice Initiatives and Dir. of Law & Policy, 
Violence Against Women Initiatives, Muskie School of Public Service, Cutler Institute for Health & 
Soc. Policy, Univ. of S. Me. (Nov. 21, 2013) (notes on file with author) (describing motives for 
protection order initiatives brought by legal aid attorneys and activists). 
 72. Klein & Orloff, supra note 70, at 996–97. 
 73. Id. at 1001, 1004. 
 74. Interview with Barbara Hart, supra note 71; see also Schechter, supra note 50, at 163. 
 75. Interview with Barbara Hart, supra note 71; see also Pence, supra note 49, at 334 (describing 
why activists were reluctant to focus on criminal justice remedies). 
 76. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest 
Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1591, 1618 (2006) (reporting that the majority of publically 
funded law firms are focused on individual services rather than law reform). 
 77. See Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, A Call to End Federal 
Restrictions on Legal Aid for the Poor 3–4 (2009) (describing efforts by conservatives to dismantle 
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limitations, LSC funded programs are prohibited from engaging in 
lobbying or other legislative advocacy with government officials.78 
Therefore, under the current federal regime, legal aid programs would be 
unable to take an affirmative role in developing legislation like the 
original protection order statute. Additional restrictions ban the use of 
LSC or private funds for organizing activities, such as those undertaken 
by grassroots coalitions that helped to pass early domestic violence 
reforms.79
Legal aid programs may still engage in many reform activities, 
despite restrictions. They may use non-LSC funds to “respond to a 
request from a legislator or other government official to testify or give 
information, analysis, or comments on a bill.”
 These structural developments support a more service-oriented 
role for legal aid, as opposed to a reform-oriented one. However, they do 
not fully explain the shift away from law reform. 
80 They may also 
communicate with the public, their clients, and the media about pending 
bills or regulations, and use the litigation process to challenge existing 
legislation or rules.81 Additionally, public funds (for example, from 
IOLTA accounts) can be used for organizing activities, and the rules do 
not prohibit using LSC funds to provide legal information and advice to 
other organizations that have a reform agenda.82 Collaboration and 
partnership with non-LSC organizations is also permissible, so long as 
the program avoids LSC-restricted activities.83 Indeed, performance 
standards introduced in 2007 encourage work resulting in systemic 
benefits for low-income communities, not just individual clients.84 As a 
result, some have argued that the shift by legal aid programs to a narrow, 
legal services approach is more a crisis of will than a result of federal 
restrictions.85
 
the legal services program); Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United 
States, 5 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 11, 29–31 (2003) (describing federal cutbacks to legal aid). 
 
 78. See Diller & Savner, supra note 77, at 5–15 (describing restrictions imposed on LSC funded 
programs); Alan W. Houseman & Linda E. Perle, What You May and May Not Do Under the Legal 
Services Corporation Restrictions, in National Center on Poverty Law, Poverty Law Manual for 
the New Lawyer (2002). 
 79. Houseman & Perle, supra note 78. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; see also Legal Servs. Corp., Advisory Opinion AO-2015-003 on D.C. Housing-Initiative 
Coordinator (Nov. 9, 2015) (advising how an LSC-funded entity could employ a coordinator for a 
collaboration with non-LSC entities who engaged in LSC-restricted activities such as lobbying). 
 84. Gary F. Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal Services, 
45 Clearinghouse Rev. J. Poverty L. & Pol’y 34, 39 (2011). 
 85. Id. (arguing that legal aid stopped focusing on antipoverty work before federal restrictions 
were imposed); see also Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced 
Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 474, 577 (1985). 
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There is also a question of what counts as law reform. As described 
by Peter Margulies, “commentators [on poverty law practice] typically 
have linked family law practice with the stereotype of service work as 
routine and apolitical.”86 In particular, engagement with family law by 
poverty lawyers has been critiqued “because of its supposed tendency to 
produce ‘intraclass transfer of resources’ from poor men to poor 
women.”87 Such work is viewed as antithetical to the mission of reformers 
seeking to restructure power relations between classes and eliminate 
poverty.88 Margulies advocates for the view that domestic violence cases 
challenge patriarchy, and are therefore political.89 However, “a traditional 
concern among poverty lawyers is that family law does not lend itself to an 
impact case agenda. This view holds that such individual service work is 
not merely apolitical, but is also counterproductive, draining resources 
away from impact work.”90 As a result, while legal aid programs perform 
a lot of family law work, this engagement may not be associated with law 
reform goals, including in cases involving domestic violence, and even for 
those legal aid programs that engage in law reform activities in other 
practice areas.91
These attitudes and trends in poverty law practice, along with the 
changes in advocacy models for survivors discussed above, are evident in 
the histories and practices of the programs in this study. The next Part 
provides information about the study, including a description of each 
program partnership, and an overview of the application process at each 
location. A brief explanation of the methodology used in the study is also 
provided. 
 
II.  This Study 
A. The Programs 
This study was conducted in two western states at self-help 
programs that I will refer to as Program A and Program B.92
 
 86. Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work 
Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L. 493, 
509 (1996). 
 Both 
programs operate as partnerships between county courts and NGOs, and 
 87. Id. (quoting Abel, supra note 85, at 609). 
 88. See Smith, supra note 84, at 36 (“The resolution of these individual demands for personal 
service, either singly or in the aggregate, has no necessary correlation whatsoever to the causes or 
conditions of poverty.”). 
 89. See Margulies, supra note 86, at 511–12. 
 90. Id. at 509. 
 91. See infra Part IV.B (discussing views about family law held by leadership at the LSC-funded 
program partner in this study). 
 92. The programs and persons who participated in this study are not identified in order to 
maintain their confidentiality. 
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are located in courthouses serving metropolitan areas. Both programs 
are utilized primarily by women of color.93 Available data shows that 
most litigants had low educational attainment and spoke a language 
other than English as their primary language.94
Program A consists of several self-help program locations operated 
as partnerships between the county and a legal aid organization 
(“LAO”). The county provides space and equipment for the program, 
and the LAO provides staff and manages program operations. The LAO 
previously provided self-help services in all but one of the current 
program locations using a limited scope representation model staffed by 
volunteer attorneys, and supplemented with staff and pro bono 
representation at hearings. These ancillary programs have largely been 
disbanded in recent years due to decreases in grant funding and layoffs of 
staff attorneys. Additionally, one of the program locations was previously 
operated by a shelter organization, and volunteers from the shelter 
continue to work as unpaid staff under the current model. At other 
locations, volunteers supplement paid interns and a full-time program 
director, who oversees and manages the program. This program serves 
more than 4000 applicants annually.
 
95
Program B provides self-help services at a single location. The 
program is run as a partnership between the county and a nonlegal 
domestic violence services organization (“DVSO”). In addition to 
providing space and equipment for the program, the county funds eight 
staff positions, including a director, four other full-time employees, and 
three part-time staff members. The DVSO funds two additional full-time 
staff positions.
 
96
 
 93. In 2009, an average of seventy-eight percent of people who filed a protection order after 
receiving services at Program A were women; 86.5% were racial or ethnic minorities. Data collected at 
Program B in 2012 showed that protection order applicants were more than four times as likely to be 
women than men; less than half were White. 
 This program started out run solely by the DVSO, using 
space provided by the court. The county stepped in with funds for a staff 
member and took over the program. The DVSO continued to participate 
by providing their trained advocates. However, the DVSO has no role in 
 94. In 2009, 86.5% of protection order applicants helped at Program A were racial or ethnic 
minorities, fifty-three percent spoke a language other than English as a preferred language, and only 
twenty-six percent had attended some college; less than thirteen percent had a college degree. Given 
the links between educational attainment and income disparity, a relatively low average income in this 
group can be assumed. See, e.g., Steven Strauss, The Connection Between Education, Income Inequality, 
and Unemployment, HuffPost Bus. (Nov. 2, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
steven-strauss/the-connection-between-ed_b_1066401.html. Similar data was not available for Program B. 
 95. Based on 2009 data drawn from new protection order cases filed at each program location in 
four one-week periods. 
 96. After the data collection period, this was reduced to one staff member due to budgeting 
constraints. 
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the administration of the program or policy setting. The program serves 
more than 5000 people annually.97
B. The Application Process 
 
Applying for a protection order is generally, and at both of these 
locations, a two-step process. Applicants initiate the process by filing ex 
parte (that is, without notice, or with limited notice, to the adverse party) 
for a temporary protection order. The application consists of a form on 
which the applicant identifies what orders are requested, and a 
supporting declaration that sets out the factual basis for the relief 
requested. Under state law in both program locations, applicants can 
request orders including for exclusive use of property, child support, 
spousal support, restitution, and attorneys fees, as well as that the 
adverse party stay away from the applicant, refrain from specified 
conduct, and surrender guns. The court may grant the requested orders 
(in whole or in part), deny the application outright, or deny the 
temporary order but set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
Temporary orders are limited to stay-away and orders for exclusive use 
of property, and last about three to four weeks. If the court sets the case 
for hearing (step two), the applicant may seek an order for a longer 
time.98 Both programs utilize nonlawyer staff members to assist 
applicants in preparing and filing their applications. However, they do so 
in different ways.99
At Program A, staff members provide applicants with one-on-one 
assistance completing the application form. A staff member asks the 
applicant questions about what orders the applicant wants, while filling 
out the forms on a computer or by hand.
 
100
 
 97. Based on 2012 data. 
 The staff member also asks 
the applicant to explain the basis for the orders (such as, why the 
applicant wants the protection order), and uses this information to draft 
the applicant’s supporting declaration. An attorney staff member then 
 98. In the jurisdiction served by Program A, the judge can grant a permanent order after a 
hearing, or continue a temporary order for a longer period of time. State law at Program B requires 
the applicant to request an extension of the temporary order on or subsequent to her application. The 
temporary order can be extended for a maximum of six months after the hearing. 
 99. Staff members also provide applicants with printed information. At Program A, this includes 
information about the legal process, including how to file and serve the application, and how to 
prepare for the evidentiary hearing. At Program B, staff members reviewing the application provide 
some applicants with an information sheet that includes contact information for the DVSO, and that 
lists considerations for safety planning. I will analyze these documents in a separate article. 
 100. Advocates led applicants through the process using prompts drawn from the form. Prompts 
were generated by the computer software, or by the advocate using the form. In either case, prompts 
mirrored the question on the form. However, as discussed further below, not all categories of relief on 
the form were covered. 
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reviews the completed application before it is filed.101 In contrast, 
applicants at Program B complete the application form themselves 
before meeting with a staff member. The completed form is then 
reviewed by one of the DVSO-funded staff members, who may augment 
the application with additional facts or details disclosed by the applicant 
during the review.102
The programs also differ in how work is delegated, and in how the 
roles that staff members perform are described. At Program A, all non-
attorney staff members perform the identical work in assisting applicants, 
and are called “advocates” in program materials. At Program B, staff 
members who interact with applicants can be divided into two categories: 
(1) front desk staff members, who interact with all applicants and answer 
the phones, answer applicants’ questions, conduct initial screenings 
(which may result in redirecting would-be applicants), hand out applications, 
and provide instructions on completing the form; and (2) back office staff 
members, who review applications. Back office staff members include the 
two DVSO employees, who are differentiated in that they are called 
“advocates,” and are identified as such by a placard on each of their 
desks. 
 There is no attorney supervision or review at 
Program B. 
Finally, the programs differ in their involvement with the rest of the 
protection order process. Applicants at Program A are responsible for 
filing the completed application and delivering the application and any 
orders that result for service on the adverse party. Conversely, Program 
B manages the administrative aspects of the process, including filing and 
delivery of documents for service; staff members also prepare the final 
order after hearing. However, obtaining a temporary order takes longer 
at this location. While applicants at Program A typically receive a 
temporary order within twenty-four hours, receiving an order at Program 
B usually takes at least two days. 
C. Methodology 
This study uses traditional qualitative methods for grounded, 
exploratory ethnographic research, including nonparticipant observation 
(of courthouse activities, self-help services, and interactions between 
applicants and staff members), and informal, semi-structured interviews 
with everyday actors (program staff members, legal aid attorneys, and 
survivor advocates).103
 
 101. The attorney is usually off-site. Staff members e-mail or fax completed applications to the 
attorney for review. Applications that are completed by applicants without a staff member’s help and 
then reviewed by a staff member are not reviewed by an attorney. 
 Observations took place at Program A over 
 102. If it is very busy, county-employed staff members review completed applications as well. 
 103. See Juliet Corbin & Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory 12–13 (3d ed. 2007) (defining grounded theory as 
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several months in 2009 and 2010, and at Program B from December 2013 
to August 2014.104 Observations were recorded in field notes.105 Field 
notes were then analyzed through an inductive process of open coding 
that identified recurring themes, patterns, and topics; these became core 
categories for further analysis.106
 
“derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process. In this 
method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another”). 
This study also fits into the subfield of institutional ethnography. See Elizabeth Townsend, Good 
Intentions Overruled: A Critique of Empowerment in the Routine Organization of Mental 
Health Services 17–29 (1998) (describing the key processes of institutional ethnography). See 
generally Marjorie L. Devault, Introduction: What Is Institutional Ethnography?, 53 Soc. Probs. 294 
(2006) (describing the field of institutional ethnography and providing examples of research projects 
that use this methodology). As this project studies multiple locations, it can also be viewed as a 
multisited ethnography. See generally George E. Marcus, Ethnography in/of the World System: The 
Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography, 24 Ann. Rev. Anthro. 95 (1995) (describing a multisited 
approach to ethnographic inquiry). Institutional ethnographers seek to uncover how organizational 
work processes shape the activities and conditions of the everyday world. Using texts and discourses as 
a starting point, institutional ethnographers focus on identifying “institutional case management 
processes and the logic, thinking and assumptions that support them.” Jane M. Sadusky et al., The 
Praxis Safety and Accountability Audit: Practicing a “Sociology for People,” 16 Violence Against 
Women 1031, 1034 (2010); see also Devault, supra note 
 The findings that emerged through this 
process showed how demeanor was shaped by the organization of work 
within the programs. These findings are detailed next in Part III. The 
findings and implications for systemic advocacy are then discussed in 
detail in Part IV. 
103, at 294 (noting that institutional 
ethnographers seek to explain the world, rather than build theory). 
 104. Observation data totaling eighty-four hours were transcribed from these preliminary 
collections; an additional 150 hours of data collected from the protection order courtroom, and lobby 
areas outside the courtroom were also transcribed. Observations at Program B were conducted until 
no new variations (for example, of demeanor type) or contradictions were observed. This data was 
consistent with observation data from Program A. 
 105. Field notes consisted of notes recorded simultaneously or contemporaneously with 
observations in the field (and augmented after leaving the field), and notes recorded surreptitiously at 
opportune moments, so as not to influence or disturb what was being observed. The first technique 
was used when observing front desk staff at Program B; the second was used primarily when observing 
advocates interacting with applicants. See John Lofland et al., Analyzing Social Settings: A 
Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis 108–16 (4th ed. 2006); W. Lawrence Neuman, 
Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 443–49 (2009) (regarding 
techniques for recording notes in and out of the field). 
 106. See Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research 105–13 (1967); see also Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, Of 
Rhetoric and Representation: The Four Faces of Ethnography, 49 Soc. Q. 1, 12 (2008) (describing the 
use of inductive analysis in ethnography). Additionally, in order to further situate the research, we also 
reviewed secondary materials, including informational materials distributed to applicants at the 
programs, and records concerning the protection order process maintained by partnering 
organizations. We also conducted legislative research on the history of civil protection order laws, and 
archival research and interviews with participants in the movement for protection order legislation on 
the connection between law reform and the battered women’s movement. See Corbin & Strauss, 
supra note 103, at 11–12 (describing the variety of sources from which qualitative data can be derived 
for grounded theory). 
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III.  Demeanor and the Organization of Work 
A. Focus on Forms 
Researchers have found that the organization of work within courts 
and organizational culture can structure the nature of interactions in 
protection order proceedings. For example, Jill Adams’s study of the 
protection order process in a Canadian court found that the division of 
labor into piecemeal work and a focus on efficiency, along with an 
emphasis on the uniform treatment of applicants, left no space for court 
personnel to feel empathy or get to know or care about the women 
applying for orders.107 Some of these findings are echoed in Wan’s study, 
which found that a focus on efficient processing of orders resulted in a 
more bureaucratic approach to client services among some advocates, 
and irritation when people needed more help because it slowed things 
down.108 Similarly, Trinch notes that paralegals assisting protection order 
applicants may act in ways that appear bureaucratic as a result of 
performing repetitive tasks.109 The task of preparing a supporting 
affidavit for a protection order that meets the legal system’s demands for 
a linear narrative also shapes the nature of the interaction between 
participants in the process.110 As noted above, Trinch’s study shows how 
paralegals working with Latina survivors contort and constrain survivors’ 
accounts of abuse, while helping them create narratives that are more 
likely to succeed at court.111 In this context, the more supportive 
dimensions of advocacy such as validation and empowerment are lost.112
As in these prior studies, the programs in this study were organized 
around the processing of protection order applications in ways that 
limited staff members’ engagement with applicants, and potentially, the 
value of their services. The emphasis on forms started at intake, which at 
both programs focused on screening applicants to see if they were 
qualified for a protection order, and made no attempt to identify safety 
issues or other legal or service needs.
 
113 Afterwards, applicants either 
progressed to the form-filling stage or were turned away or redirected.114
 
 107. Jill Adams, The Civil Restraining Order Application Process: Textually Mediated Institutional 
Case Management, 10 Ethnography 185, 202–03 (2009). 
 
 108. Wan, supra note 7, at 624–25. 
 109. Trinch, supra note 45, at 497. 
 110. Id. at 477; see also id. at 497 (noting that advocates co-construct the account of abuse with 
survivors). 
 111. Id. at 497. 
 112. Id. at 498. 
 113. See Stoever, supra note 27, at 353–54 (arguing that safety planning is an essential component 
of advocacy). 
 114. The applicants who were turned away because the program was too busy to assist them, or 
because they had arrived after the cut off time, were generally told to return the next day the program 
was open. Applicants who did not identify a qualifying relationship were generally redirected to apply 
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As noted, at Program A applicants who received assistance completing 
the application form sat with an advocate, who completed the form on 
the computer (or on occasion by hand if the computer was down or there 
were no computers available). At Program B, applicants received 
instructions on completing the forms and then filled them out 
themselves. If applicants were subsequently seen by an advocate, the 
focus was on ascertaining whether the forms were complete and accurate. 
Indeed, although both Programs described a broad approach to services 
on their websites and other materials, matters beyond processing the 
application form were entirely peripheral to the process at these 
programs.115
Unlike advocates observed by Wan, who sometimes assisted women 
in finding a shelter or completing forms in other aspects of their family 
law case,
 
116 interactions with staff members at Programs A and B were 
almost exclusively limited to the process of obtaining a temporary 
protection order. Information about safety planning (provided only at 
Program B) and referrals was relegated to printed materials that were 
distributed to applicants before they left the location. Even information 
about the protection order process beyond the temporary order—for 
instance, preparing for the subsequent evidentiary hearing—which was 
provided only at Program A, was provided on a handout.117
 
for an anti-stalking or harassment order. Staff at Program B sometimes also screened for whether the 
adverse party was in custody; if so, they redirected the applicant to apply for an emergency protection 
order. 
 Moreover, 
individuals who were not assisted at either program, or who dropped off 
applications at Program B without seeing an advocate, typically did not 
receive these materials at all. Further, as in Adams’s study, the division 
of labor also fragmented staff members’ contact with applicants at 
Program B—in this case between front desk staff members who screened 
applicants and instructed them on filling out forms, and the advocates 
who reviewed applicants’ completed paperwork. These conditions 
limited staff members’ ability to connect with applicants and understand 
or care about their needs and concerns, much less address them. Other 
aspects of the workplace environment may also help explain staff 
members’ demeanor, including the physical environment. 
 115. The website for the program of which Program A is a part advertises, “advocates provide 
critical information and assistance to victims of domestic violence, including . . . referrals to myriad 
social services.” The website for Program B claims the program aims to provide “information 
regarding court-related procedures, safety planning and community awareness of domestic violence 
issues.” 
 116. See Wan, supra note 7, at 619 (providing examples of advocates providing support and 
assistance to applicants beyond the application process). 
 117. These materials are themselves expressive in ways akin to demeanor and will be analyzed in 
another article. 
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B. Self-Help Work Environment 
As Wan notes, while advocates’ bureaucratic—or worse—treatment 
of applicants is troubling, “it is important to recognize the conditions 
under which [applicants] received such treatment.”118
1. Lack of Privacy 
 The conditions 
faced by staff members at the locations in this study are detailed below. 
Wan observed that the environment in which the advocates she 
observed worked “was dismal, dirty, and crowded.”119 These advocates 
also carried high case volumes.120 Wan reasoned that it was “possible that 
advocates exhibited bureaucratic demeanor because they found such 
demeanor to be the easiest way of working in a small and dismal 
environment and the most efficient way of assisting large numbers of 
people.”121
Additionally, both locations at Program A were particularly 
cramped, and there were no partitions between advocates as they 
assisted applicants. As a result, exchanges between applicants and staff 
members could easily be overheard. Similarly, exchanges between front 
desk staff and applicants at Program B were generally audible to 
everyone else in line or in the crowded waiting room. The only relatively 
private space at either location was at Program B, which had partitions 
separating the advocates from one another and other staff members. In 
the majority of interactions at these programs, however, the design of the 
program site did not foster the potential for intimacy suggested by the 
emphasis on one-on-one assistance. Moreover, neither program had 
childcare, and applicants often brought their children. This added to the 
crowded and sometimes noisy atmosphere of the programs. Further, the 
presence of young children was not conducive to sharing intimate 
information about abuse, especially in cases where the child was also a 
victim, or where the abuser was the child’s parent or another family 
member. 
 While I would not describe the facilities at Program A or B as 
dirty or especially dingy, they were busy and lacked privacy. Staff 
members’ awareness of the volume of applicants needing their attention 
was undoubtedly a factor influencing their interactions with individual 
applicants, leading to some applicants being turned away when the program 
was at capacity. 
 
 118. Wan, supra note 7, at 626. 
 119. Id. at 626–27. 
 120. Id. at 627. 
 121. Id. 
J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc  (Do Not Delete) 6/19/2016 11:59 AM 
June 2016]    FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS 1321 
2. Inadequate Translation Services 
Limited resources of other kinds also created tensions for staff and 
applicants alike and inhibited effective assistance. This is exemplified by 
the lack of adequate translation services. Applicants at both locations 
were primarily Latino/a with many speaking English as a second language, 
while staff members at both programs were primarily monolingual in 
English. At Program A, there were no Spanish-speaking staff members 
who regularly worked at the busiest location. As a result, applicants were 
sometimes turned away because they could not be helped. At Program 
B, two of the four part-time front desk workers were bilingual in Spanish, 
but none of the staff members who reviewed applications spoke Spanish. 
Program B used court translators for monolingual applicants, but this 
meant that applicants had to wait for a translator to be free to assist 
them. As a result, applicants who needed a translator waited significantly 
longer than other applicants to see an advocate. The frequent inability of 
staff members to communicate with non-English speaking applicants 
obviously hindered their ability to interact and relate with these individuals. 
Moreover, the inability of staff members to understand applicants who did 
not speak fluent English triggered patronizing/condescending demeanor on 
at least one occasion. 
3. Lack of Training and Accountability 
Staff members also received minimal training, focused primarily on 
the application process. At Program A, staff members received 
approximately one half-day of training, which included a brief overview 
of the “cycle of violence” in domestic violence relationships and no 
training on intersectional concerns relating to race, ethnicity, or class. 
Front desk staff at Program B received only what the program 
administrator called “on the job” training for their regular job duties. 
This consisted of shadowing and then being observed by another worker 
until they were deemed competent to manage the desk on their own. 
Only the two advocates at Program B had received intensive training on 
domestic violence, including cultural competency training, which was 
provided by the program’s shelter partner. However, as discussed further 
below, their relationship to their funding advocacy organization was very 
attenuated, which diminished the value of their access to training and 
other supportive resources as an ongoing matter. 
Further, all staff members were essentially unsupervised and largely 
unaccountable to the public they served. None of the workers observed 
were subject to any kind of regular employment evaluation by a 
supervisor. Program A conducted annual mailed surveys of applicants 
who had used the program, and a minimal number were returned each 
year with generally favorable results. Program B had never conducted an 
evaluation of its services or staff. By the same token, neither did they 
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receive support for the stress and burnout likely experienced from their 
work environments. 
4. Lack of Support for Vicarious Trauma 
Wan identifies secondary or vicarious trauma as another factor that 
may contribute to bureaucratic treatment of applicants by advocates.122 
Researchers have found that counselors working with victims of sexual 
assault and other traumatic experiences may over time begin to suffer 
symptoms of vicarious traumatization or post-traumatic stress disorder as 
a result.123 Counselors also struggled to deal with the ineffectiveness of 
courts and other systems that were supposed to help their clients but 
failed to do so.124 In this way, being ensconced within ineffective systems 
became a source of trauma for both those helping victims and for victims 
themselves. “Although advocates are not counselors,” Wan notes that 
“they engage[] in some of the same activities as counselors, [such as] 
hearing repeated stories of horrific abuse . . . .”125 They might therefore 
react bureaucratically to applicants in order to avoid the adverse effects 
of trauma that can result from emotional involvement with clients.126
C. Isolation from Advocacy Organizations 
 
Similarly, staff members in self-help programs may find it easier to 
remain emotionally distant from applicants to whom they can offer little 
substantive help in exchanges that may cause them emotional stress. This 
problem may be exacerbated for advocates who are isolated from 
erstwhile sources of support, such as advocacy-based organizations. The 
next Subpart discusses the organization of program partnerships in 
relation to the self-help work environment and self-help services. 
Staff members as well as applicants suffered from program partnerships 
that failed to utilize advocacy resources. Instead, these relationships 
sometimes created new hierarchies that, like bureaucratization, inhibited 
advocacy functions. For example, at Program A, volunteer advocates 
from a local shelter organization had previously run one of the program 
locations themselves. When legal aid took over the program, these 
advocates remained as volunteers. Advocates expressed frustration with 
the new program, which they regarded as less efficient and less client 
centered than their own. They reported that, by assisting applicants in 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Lisa McCann & Laurie Anne Pearlman, Vicarious Traumatization: A Framework for 
Understanding the Psychological Effects of Working with Victims, 3 J. Traumatic Stress 131, 144 
(1990); see also Laura J. Schauben & Patricia A. Frazier, Vicarious Trauma: The Effects on Female 
Counselors of Working with Sexual Violence Survivors, 19 Psych. Women Q. 49, 50 (1995). 
 124. Schauben & Frazier, supra note 123, at 57. 
 125. Wan, supra note 7, at 627. 
 126. Id. 
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groups, they had helped more applicants and had provided more 
complete assistance than the current program.127 Legal aid, however, 
made them work with applicants individually. While advocates reported 
that completing forms on the computer was easier, it slowed things down 
when the computers malfunctioned, which happened frequently. 
Advocates were also slowed down by the requirement that lawyers 
review the applications they completed and resented what they perceived 
as a lack of appreciation for their expertise. Additionally, they resented 
being cut off from judges and the administrative staff of the court, with 
whom they previously communicated directly, receiving direct feedback 
on their work, and discussing problems regarding the legal process. Now 
that legal aid had assumed these roles, advocates felt disconnected from 
the court and meaningful feedback and communication. One advocate 
said of attorney supervision, “we take umbrage.”128
Advocates at Program A also believed that the legal aid attorneys 
were insufficiently victim centered. They pointed in particular to the 
program’s policy on helping represented applicants. Applicants sometimes 
revealed that they had an attorney who was helping them with their family 
law case, but were proceeding without counsel in the protection order 
process. Advocates reported that the program had previously assisted 
these applicants because it was economically beneficial to the applicant 
to receive the program’s help rather than to use her lawyer, and the court 
accepted this practice. Legal aid, however, insisted that applicants with 
attorneys be turned away, telling advocates, “their attorneys are just lazy 
and dumping clients on us,” and seemingly disregarded the impact on the 
applicant. 
 
These advocates also noted some improvements with attorney 
involvement. In particular, they reported learning a broader view of 
domestic violence: previously, the program had only assisted female 
applicants, and not men or adverse parties, even if the latter were 
women. Advocates spoke of learning more about same-sex victims who 
were men under the new regime, and also to empathize with respondents’ 
need for assistance. One advocate noted that attorney review relieves her 
worry that advocates will be blamed for negative outcomes. However, 
advocates appeared wary of what one advocate called a shift from 
“victims to litigants” under the new model. 
Advocates at Program B also lacked effective input into program 
practices, although the shelter organization paying their salaries was 
touted as a program “partner.” Moreover, the client-centered goals of 
the shelter partner, to the extent internalized and shared by the 
 
 127. Specifically, they had helped applicants with financial disclosures required in applications for 
child or spousal support, which the current program failed to do. 
 128. Interview with Program A Advocate (Apr. 29, 2010) (transcript on file with author). 
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advocates, seemed to conflict with the expectations of neutrality placed 
upon them by program administrators. These dynamics are illustrated by 
tensions between one of the shelter advocates and program 
administrators over compliance with state child abuse reporting laws. 
The shelter partner at Program B had a policy of exercising discretion to 
avoid reporting in most cases unless there was a clear indication of 
ongoing child endangerment. If a report was necessary, the policy was to 
encourage the client to make the report. In contrast, the program’s policy 
was to report any suspected abuse, even if it was outside the advocate’s 
direct knowledge or not clearly ongoing. One advocate described her 
efforts to resist this broader definition of reportable abuse, including 
refusing to call child protection authorities regarding a case that met the 
program’s definition of a reportable case, but not the shelter’s policy. 
When the program administrator contacted authorities about the case, 
the advocate continued to resist by refusing to provide additional 
information to the investigator who contacted her to follow up. This 
advocate had also urged the program administrator to provide a 
disclosure to applicants about the reporting policy before they met with 
an advocate, a proposal that had not been implemented. 
Advocates at Program B were also separated from the shelter 
organization partnering with the court, physically and in terms of training 
and support. The shelter program director reported that these advocates 
were hesitant to attend trainings and team meetings, where other 
advocates obtained vital information and support, because it meant 
fewer applicants would receive individual assistance at the program. This 
isolation also undermined the shelter’s goal of connecting the program to 
system advocacy—for example, by promoting referrals of applicants who 
had a related criminal case to shelter advocates in the prosecutor’s office. 
The program director reported that advocates in the program rarely 
made appropriate referrals to outside services, presumably because of 
the attenuated nature of their relationship to shelter goals and 
resources.129
These conflicts highlight tensions between the partiality of the 
advocacy perspective and the goal of impartiality in self-help services, as 
well as the relative powerlessness of the advocacy-based program partner 
to set policy at this location. At both locations, the isolation from 
advocacy organizations appeared to drain staff members’ morale and 
may have affected demeanor toward applicants as staff met what they 
perceived as lowered expectations for individualized assistance and support. 
 
 
 129. Legal aid attorneys in the community also reported that they did not receive referrals from 
the self-help program, although they encouraged these referrals by leaving fliers about their services 
with the staff. 
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IV.  Implications and Conclusions 
A. Future Research 
More studies of NGO-court partnerships to provide self-help 
services are needed to learn more about what organizational, system, and 
program differences matter to how services are provided, as well as how 
these programs impact the organizations and systems of which they are a 
part. Future studies should also examine different models of service 
delivery, such as those using limited scope representation for completing 
forms. 
In addition, future studies should explore the impact of local legal 
cultures on services for unrepresented litigants. Several findings in the 
present study suggest the role of local legal culture on decisions about 
the design of the programs and the expressive qualities of staff members. 
For example, the decision at Program B not to help applicants complete 
forms was consistent with comments from staff members and other 
players in the system that evidenced a mistrust of both applicants and 
advocacy processes—or what might be called an “anti-legal” or “anti-
legal advocacy” culture that applied to domestic violence cases. For 
example, the director of Program B and local legal aid attorneys thought 
judges would give less credibility to applicants who had assistance 
completing their forms. One judge reportedly told the director, when she 
proposed providing computers for applicants to use, that he preferred to 
actually see their handwriting, as though he could glean something of 
their credibility from seeing it. 
In contrast, system participants at Program A evinced a more 
positive attitude about the benefits to be gained through assisting 
applicants with the legal process and a more positive attitude toward 
lawyers and legalism in general. This may have supported the greater 
level of assistance provided to applicants at Program A. For example, the 
director at Program A described a judicial officer with a history of 
hostility to domestic violence claims who had a better opinion of 
applicants after the LAO took over because the quality of declarations 
had purportedly gone up, and the program was supervised by “officers of 
the court.” That said, this heightened credibility was associated with 
lawyers in a nonadvocacy role—as “court officers” rather than zealous 
advocates. Moreover, Program A as well as Program B limited the 
supportive role of staff members through processes that restricted 
individualized assistance. Together, however, these examples and the 
influence of the court on staff attitudes and advice to applicants suggests 
the importance of studying self-help in the larger context of the court, 
including judicial attitudes, and the legal system of which it is a part. 
More generally, these findings show the need for an expansive 
research agenda that considers the impact of access to justice 
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interventions on advocacy systems and on substantive justice goals, as 
well as on more narrowly defined case outcomes. Greater use of 
ethnographic methods to study self-help services and court systems will 
help this effort. By building knowledge from the ground up, researchers 
can uncover and describe how structures of power and subordination are 
constructed through everyday interactions in legal settings, and identify 
how they might be dismantled. 
B. What Can Be Done to Improve Self-Help Now 
Some solutions to the structural problems recounted herein are 
straightforward, albeit possibly challenging to implement when resources 
are limited: self-help programs should find ways to provide adequate 
translation services, improve provisions for privacy and childcare needs, 
and consider whether their hours are likely to accommodate applicant 
availability. Referrals should be available and readily provided. Staff 
members should receive training on domestic violence and cultural 
competency, and programs should support self-care for vicarious trauma. 
For lay advocacy partners, staff members could do rotations in the 
program in order to keep their training fresh and expose them to other 
aspects of advocacy work. Given the different roles lay advocates 
perform in self-help programs and for clients, lay advocacy organizations 
should also consider sending advocates with clients who use self-help 
programs. 
More broadly, NGOs should assess whether they are balancing 
advocacy with self-help and partnering with courts in ways that increase 
rather than constrain representation and reform. The history of the 
programs in this study shows how self-help might replace or disrupt 
preexisting programs and alternative advocacy models. By focusing on a 
single legal remedy, self-help has a much narrower focus than traditional 
lay advocacy, or legal advocacy aimed at systemic reform, yet may absorb 
advocacy resources that could be directed more broadly. Here, the 
results were mixed. Program A replaced a similarly focused program 
that—while more effective in some respects (completing all forms for 
economic relief)—lacked the benefits of legal expertise. Lack of legal 
expertise could make self-help programs less able to maintain 
independence from the court—although the issue of independence is a 
complex one. 
At Program B, the lack of independence of the program director 
from the court is a major issue. As a county employee and a nonlawyer, 
the director lacks the wherewithal to pursue an agenda independent of 
the court or the professional knowledge to carry it out. Similarly, the 
partnering DVSO—while organizationally independent of the court—
was hamstrung by its lack of independent legal knowledge and capacity 
to effectively pressure the court on behalf of applicants through appeals 
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or other measures. The DVSO sunk financial resources into a program 
that did not meet its objectives or its clients’ needs, and felt incapacitated 
to challenge the program’s operation in a community with few resources. 
In contrast, the NGO partner at Program A is not only 
organizationally independent from the court, but as a legal aid provider 
obviously possesses legal expertise. Nonetheless, staff members 
referenced what the court wanted when restricting access to remedies for 
applicants, seemingly without reference to a considered, independent 
legal analysis. This might relate to organizational priorities as well as 
workplace structure. The LAO has a reputation for not being interested 
in family law, a viewpoint confirmed by attorneys on staff and the 
program director. Reflecting the perspectives on family law held by some 
poverty lawyers, discussed above, the LAO’s leadership was reportedly 
more interested in other practice areas that they believed were more 
relevant to social change goals.130
The courts may therefore have influenced both Program A and 
Program B more than the other way around. Figure 1 illustrates this 
dynamic. The relative influence of the court over both programs, and 
their respective NGO partners, is reflected in the solid shape for the 
court. Patterned shapes depict the more “permeable” nature of each self-
help program (“SHP”), and the NGOs. Additionally, the isolation of 
DVSO advocates within Programs A and B is depicted by the 
encapsulation of a small diamond shape in the same pattern as the 
DVSO, representing the DVSO staff members within each program. 
 This likely limited the development of 
goals and objectives for the self-help program, and the resources made 
available to position it within a broader advocacy strategy. Indeed, while 
both programs in this study identified some staff members as 
“advocates,” staff and administrators were careful to distinguish this role 
from traditional notions of advocacy. All emphasized that advocates at 
the self-help program do not “take sides” or affirmatively advocate for 
anyone. Rather they provide general information to litigants about the 
legal process. Additionally, the LAO does not provide representation to 
applicants at hearings at significant levels or on appeals, or engage in 
other advocacy work aimed at systemic reform. Also, because of the way 
“turf” is divided up in the county, there is no other legal aid organization 
able or willing to assist. As a result, a large portion of the county is 
without a reform-oriented legal services program. In the self-help 
program, a lack of support from attorneys left staff members reliant on 
judicial cues for how to advise applicants. 
 
 130. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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Similarly, each DVSO’s lack of influence over program policies and 
practices is shown by their position outside the partnership.131
Figure 1: System Analysis of Self-Help Partnerships 
 
 
These findings show how the failure to provide culturally and legally 
competent services can arise from multiple sources, including lack of 
capacity, poorly navigated tradeoffs between helping more people and 
the routinization of services, and a lack of interest in integrating self-help 
into a larger advocacy or reform strategy. In some instances, NGO 
partners might reconsider partnerships with court-affiliated self-help 
programs that drain resources without effectuating advocacy goals. 
However, better self-help services can also be achieved by applying 
principles of social justice advocacy.132
Although a full discussion of what this might look like is beyond the 
scope of this Article, models for progressive approaches to self-help 
exist, and provide accessible alternatives to railroading individuals 
through bureaucratic services that disregard individual needs and perpetuate 
stereotypes.
 
133
 
 131. Although the DVSO associated with Program A is not a program partner, it is still connected 
through its volunteers, who dedicate time to the program as well as to the DVSO. 
 Indeed, self-help presents opportunities for group work and 
community education that are fundamental precepts of social justice 
 132. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 Geo. J. 
on Poverty L. & Pol’y 473, 510–26 (2015) (detailing the key features of social justice advocacy in 
lawyering, social work, and lay victim advocacy). 
 133. Id. at 526–41 (laying out the foundations for a legal services program informed by social 
justice advocacy principles). 
J - Macdowell_17 (Dukanovic).doc  (Do Not Delete) 6/19/2016 11:59 AM 
June 2016]    FROM VICTIMS TO LITIGANTS 1329 
advocacy.134 As a social justice practice, educating people about how to 
approach the court involves exposing the reasons for conventional 
narratives so that individuals can participate more fully in decisions 
about how and when to tell their stories—including whether to depart 
from convention in the telling.135
Applications for funding should be required to show the capacity of 
NGO partners to maintain independence from the court, and for 
culturally competent services. Independence of the court should include 
both capacity for analysis of legal issues and strategies, and capacity for 
systemic reform that benefits vulnerable litigants. In this regard, 
collaborations between legal aid and lay advocacy organizations in which 
both contribute expertise to the partnership should be encouraged. Lay 
advocates bring needed expertise in domestic violence, and a broader 
perspective to supportive services.
 This process can also result in the 
construction of multiple templates for narratives about domestic 
violence, rather than just one, to better fit the diversity of circumstances 
that abuse survivors present. Any mode for service delivery can succumb 
to routinization and its attendant problems. Thus, a normative 
commitment to social justice may be the most important starting point 
for reconnecting services for survivors, such as self-help, to social change 
goals aimed at empowering individuals and eliminating gender violence. 
To the extent that it may not be clear to some providers how legal 
assistance for unrepresented litigants fits into a social justice mission, 
funding requirements can help incentivize a better balancing of priorities. 
136 Lawyers provide expertise necessary 
to independently assess the legal scheme, related issues such as child 
welfare reporting requirements, and other legal issues and strategies.137 
Proposals or agreements for self-help programs should explain how the 
NGO partners will ensure their collaboration maximizes the benefits of 
their respective expertise, and ensure both are involved in 
decisionmaking and priority setting.138
 
 134. Id. at 512 (“The component of education is at the center of social justice lawyering: education 
of the lawyer, as well as the client or community.”). Such opportunities can be balanced with the 
applicants’ desire for privacy by providing targeted one-on-one assistance at critical junctures—at 
intake for example. 
 Additionally, preference should be 
 135. Id. at 511 (describing storytelling as a method for revealing the social construction of the 
world, and thus essential to social justice advocacy). 
 136. See id. at 522–24 (describing the expertise lay advocates contribute to a social justice advocacy 
program). 
 137. Id. at 521–22 (describing the expertise of lawyers); see also Colleen F. Shanahan et al., 
Representation in Context: Party Power and Lawyer Expertise 6 (Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (defining attorney expertise as: substantive, such as knowledge of the 
rules of law; relational, such as understanding how to navigate among legal actors and settings; and 
strategic, such as synthesizing substantive and relational knowledge to make informed choices for 
clients). 
 138. MacDowell, supra note 132, at 536–38 (discussing the benefits of collaboration between lay 
advocates and lawyers). 
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given to programs that will connect self-help assistance to direct 
advocacy services (lay and/or legal) and systemic reform activities. The 
NGO partners should be required to explain how the self-help program 
would coordinate with advocacy activities to maximize services to 
individuals using the program and benefit the larger goal of eliminating 
domestic violence. Independent program evaluation that critically 
assesses services to make sure these goals are met is vitally important and 
can also be incentivized through funding channels.139
In sum, self-help is not inherently incompatible with empowerment 
or structural reform goals. However, this study shows how self-help 
programs for abuse survivors may shift the focus from victims to litigants 
without eliminating foundational stereotypes about victims (and 
perpetrators) or other barriers to the courts and to justice. By replacing 
notions of neutrality with structures that support social justice advocacy, 
self-help programs may become a creative part of the solution. 
 
 
 
 139. Id. at 539–40 (advocating for program evaluation that examines “whether the program’s 
efforts reduce punitive practices, unwanted interventions, and the influence of bias, while increasing 
judicial compliance with the law. [Such an approach] would also develop methods to examine whether 
client-litigants are empowered to address the problems that brought them to the program.”). For a 
detailed discussion and examples of the role clinical legal education can play in meeting needs for 
empirical access to justice research, including program evaluation, see Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, 
The Clinic Lab Office, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 161–68. 
